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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model for a small open economy
with imperfect ﬁnancial market. It provides a framework to analyze
the role of credit constraints and debt denomination in the generation
and ampliﬁcation of macroeconomic instability in an open economy
context. As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the imperfection in the
ﬁnancial market results from the existence of a costly state of veriﬁ-
cation (CSV) problem. Entrepreneurs whose net worth is not enough
to ﬁnance their desired physical investment have to pay a premium
above the risk-free interest rate to obtain external funds. Other key
ingredients of the model are that a foreign good is used as an input in
the production of the capital good, and that the debt is denominated
in terms of the foreign good. Real exchange rate depreciations gener-
ate an increase in the cost of producing capital and a reduction in the
net worth of entrepreneurs due to the debt denomination. Therefore,
recessionary eﬀects can be deepened.
∗I am indebted to Mark Gertler and Andrés Velasco for their valuable advice. I also
thank William Baumol, Michele Cavallo and Boyan Jovanovic for their useful comments.
Of course, all errors are mine.
11 Introduction
After the …nancial crises that took place in East Asia at the end of 1997,
economists turned to the available …nancial crisis models, expecting to …nd
a feasible explanation for those events. They discovered that no one model
provided a good enough “…t” for the crisis at hand. The existing models for
…nancial crises have at their roots either …scal de…cits or credibility prob-
lems associated with the trade-o¤ between high unemployment and pegged
exchange rates. Neither of these elements were present in the countries af-
fected by the 1997 …nancial upheaval.
This lack of a satisfactory explanation to the crisis at hand has given rise
to a need for new modes of thought in the study of …nancial crises. One
of these new lines of research has started to take elements of the “closed
economy” literature on credit constraints to be applied in an open economy
context. Open economy considerations such as debt denomination, real ex-
change rate and foreign goods give a new dimension to the credit constraint
problem faced by entrepreneurs with the potentiality of deepening its role in
the propagation of economy instability. In this paper I attempt to construct
a model to evaluate the role of credit constraints and debt denomination on
the propagation of economic instability.
Initially two explanations were o¤ered for the recent …nancial turmoil
in East Asia.1 The …rst focuses on moral hazard as a common source of
over-investment, excessive external borrowing and signi…cant current account
de…cits.2 In this line of research, the implicit public guarantees of corporate
investment stimulate investment projects which, under di¤erent conditions,
simply would not be pro…table. The crisis is triggered by a negative shock
that generates in‡ationary expectations due to future …scal de…cits, asso-
ciated with the bailout policy. A second possible explanation for the 1997
crisis places more emphasis on the problems which grow out of an upper end
mismatch between a country’s short-term obligations denominated in foreign
currency and the actual amount of foreign currency to which that country
has access on short notice.3 In this scenario, the country in question is ex-
tremely vulnerable to a reversal of capital in‡ows. Chang and Velasco (1998)
1Additionally, these hypothesis have been presented as explanations to …nancial crises
a¤ecting Chile (1982) and Mexico (1994).
2See Diaz-Alejandro (1985), McKinnon, Pill (1996), Krugman (1998), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1998), and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999).
3See Chang and Velasco (1999), and Goldfajn and Valdés (1997).
2describe it this way: “Bankruptcies, payments moratoria and asset price col-
lapses proliferate. The panic feeds on itself, causing foreign creditors to call
in loans and deposits to withdraw funds from banks -all of which magni…ed
the illiquidity of domestic …nancial institutions and forced yet another round
of costly asset liquidation and price de‡ation”.
Without a doubt some elements of each of these two models were present
in the East Asian economies at the time of the crisis. But no little skepticism
has risen with regard to how viable the models are as complete explanations
unto themselves. It is, arguably, hard to believe that these models can cap-
ture the full magnitude of the events in question or of their propagation.
For example, based on Krugman’s (1999) argument let us consider a key
indicator of bad-lending: the non-performing loan indicator. A higher than
normal level of this indicator (with respect to its usual trend) could represent
a signal of potential problems in the allocation of loans. Although the level
of this indicator did in fact rise after the East …nancial crisis was triggered,
its magnitude prior to the crises was not, in fact, abnormal in most of the
countries involved. It is, of course, the level before the crisis that is most
relevant when examining the validity of the moral hazard-over-investment
model. Regarding the model of international illiquidity even though it is ca-
pable of generating multiple equilibria and therefore it provides a framework
for contagion, it seems to tell just a portion of the story. In this model …nan-
cial distress comes from early and costly liquidation of investment. However,
as Krugman (1999) has pointed out early liquidations account for just a
small part of an economy’s …nancial distress. Endogenous liquidation e¤ects
such as …rms collapsing due to debt denomination better re‡ect the reality
of …nancial crises.
Recently, a new line of research has begun paying attention to the role
played by …nancial market imperfections in the “new variety of crises”.
Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (1999a,b) and Krugman (1999), among oth-
ers, have argued that one source of …nancial instability can be found in the
role played by credit constraints. Consider a situation in which the ability of
a …rm to borrow is limited by its net worth. Also assume that …rms’ debts
are denominated in foreign currency, while their income is generated in the
local currency. In this scenario, a devaluation could generate two di¤erent
e¤ects going in opposite directions. On the one hand, a devaluation stimu-
lates aggregate demand by its e¤ect on net exports. On the other hand, the
same devaluation increases the interest rate through its e¤ect on net worth,
generating a decrease in aggregate demand through a decrease in investment.
3One crucial and so far unsettled step for this line of research is to provide a
model able to capture the main characteristics previously mentioned with-
out resorting to oversimpli…ed assumptions. In particular, lack of dynamics
and ad-hoc assumptions about the nature of the …nancial imperfection has
obfuscated the results obtained.
This paper presents a dynamic model for a small open economy with
imperfect …nancial market that provides a framework to e¤ects of external
shocks in the generation and ampli…cation of economic instability. The main
elements of the model are:
Credit constraints: as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the imperfection in
the …nancial market results from the existence of a costly state of veri…cation
(CSV) problem. Entrepreneurs whose net worth is not enough to …nance
their desired physical investment have to pay a premium above the risk-free
interest rate to obtain external funds.
Foreign good requirement: a foreign good is used as input in the produc-
tion of the capital good. In this context, external shocks that generate a real
exchange rate depreciation generate an increase in the cost of producing capi-
tal, in turn, inducing to a reduction in investment and output. Moreover, the
increase in the price of capital reduces entrepreneurs’ net worth/investment
expenditures ratio, increasing the risk premium that entrepreneurs have to
pay for every level of capital. Thus, investment and subsequent output are
a¤ected negatively even more.
Debt denomination: debt is denominated in terms of the foreign good. In
this context, negative shocks that generate a depreciation of the real exchange
rate reduce the net worth of the economy due to debt denomination. Again,
the fall in net worth limits the ability of entrepreneurs to obtain external
funds, damaging investment.
In this context, recessionary e¤ects of negative external shocks can be
deepened. Therefore, more severe losses in output and investment are pre-
dicted by the model. This pattern can to some extent resemble the one
observed in …nancial crisis episodes such as Chile (1982), Mexico (1994), and
East Asia (1994).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main char-
acteristics of the model. Section 3 discusses the …nancial contract problem.
Section 4 studies the equilibrium conditions and the sources of instability in
this model economy. Section 6 concludes.
42 The Model
In this section I develop a dynamic model for a small open economy with two
kinds of …nal goods: home and foreign; and one intermediate good, capital.
There are three di¤erent types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, and for-
eign lenders. Households have in…nite horizons and their basic activities are
working, consuming, and saving. Entrepreneurs have …nite horizons and they
only engage in investment and production activities. Each period a fraction
(1-±) of entrepreneurs goes out of business.4 Those who go out of business at
period t are replaced by new entrepreneurs, therefore the number of entre-
preneurs is kept constant. Each period t, entrepreneurs who survive to the
next period (t+1) supply one unit of labor inelastically.5 Also entrepreneurs
consume only in the period that they die. Additionally, entrepreneurs are
assumed risk-neutral.
In each period t entrepreneurs produce capital using home and foreign
goods as inputs. The capital produced in period t is combined with labor
(supplied by households and entrepreneurs) to produce the home good in
period t+1. Purchases of home and foreign goods in period t are …nanced by
entrepreneurial net worth and borrowing from external intermediaries. The
net worth of an entrepreneur is de…ned as the capital gains accumulated from
previous capital investments plus the wage received in exchange for supplying
labor.
The imperfection in the …nancial market is due to the existence of a
costly state of veri…cation (CSV) problem. Under this assumption, only
the borrower (entrepreneur) can observe the outcome of any speci…c capital
investment at no cost. In this context, the …nancial contract involves auditing
strategies by lenders, which introduces agency costs into the process. Net
worth is critical in this context. A higher level of self-…nancing investment
mitigates the agency-cost problems, reducing the external …nance premium
that entrepreneurs face. Thereby, increasing potential investment.
I also assume that foreign debt is denominated in terms of the foreign
good. This assumption introduces an additional source of ‡uctuation of net
worth. Unexpected changes in relative prices (or real exchange rate) generate
4This implies that the expected lifetime for each entrepreneur is 1
1¡±:
5Then, each period entrepreneurs who supply labor are old entrepreneurs who survive
to the next period and new born entrepreneurs. The assumption that new entrepreneurs
work the …rst period they are born allows them to have a positive net worth (equals to
their real wage) at the moment they ask for a loan in the …nancial market.
5variations in entrepreneurs’ net worth, a¤ecting directly the external …nance
premium that they have to pay and, consequently, the investment that they
can a¤ord. Hence, this a¤ects production and net worth the next period
(and so on), generating a persistent pattern.
We analyze now the structure of the model in more detail.
2.1 Environment
Goods. There are three goods. A home good, a foreign good and a capital
good. Capital is not consumed but used in production of the home good.
For expository reasons, capital is assumed to depreciate fully.
Households. There is a continuum of households of length unity which ob-
tain utility from real consumption of home and foreign goods. Also, each
household supplies labor inelastically in every period and invests its savings
in an external …nancial intermediary that pays the riskless rate of return.
Let CH
t and CF
t denote household consumption of home and foreign goods
respectively. Wt is the real wage for household labor, and Bt are the deposits
held at external intermediaries (denominated in terms of the foreign good)
yielding a risk-free world real interest rate R¤. The household’s objective
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tBt ¡ ptBt+1; (2)
where pt is the relative price of the foreign good in terms of the home good
or real exchange rate in this model. The household chooses CH
t , CF
t , and
Bt+1 to maximize (1) subject to (2).
Production Technology. The home good is produced by a constant-returns
technology using capital good and labor. Labor is supplied inelastically by







6where Yt is aggregate amount of home good output, Kt is the aggregate
amount of capital good produced by entrepreneurs in period t-1, Lt is the
supply of labor, At is a productivity parameter and ® is the capital share in
the total output.
Investment Technology. Home and foreign goods are combined in period



















t ) is the amount of home (foreign) good used to produce the
capital good, and µ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods.
Now, we de…ne the capital-based price index q. The capital-based price
index q is the minimum expenditure, Z=IH+pIF such that I=1, given p.
In other words, q measures the least expenditure of home goods that buys a
unit of investment. We can prove that




Note that the capital-based index q is an increasing function of p. Now,
we can de…ne the amount of home and foreign goods used in the production













These equations state that the demand for the home (foreign) good is
proportional to real investment with a proportional coe¢cient that is an
isoelastic function of the ratio of the home good’s price (foreign good’s price)
to the capital-based index.






where !j is a disturbance a¤ecting entrepreneur j0s production of capital
good. This disturbance satis…es E(!j)=1 and c.d.f. F(!). The imperfection
7in the capital market stems from the existence of asymmetric information.
The outcome of the investment technology (the realization of shock !j) can
only be observed without cost by the entrepreneur. Other agents in the
economy (lenders) have to pay a fraction ¹ of capital good in order to learn
the e¤ective outcome. Random auditing is not feasible; that is, lenders can
pre-commit to auditing in pre-determined states only with probability one.
Outputs of projects undertaken in period t are mutually independent,
so there is no aggregate uncertainty about the aggregate quantity of capi-
tal available for production at t+1 given a level of investment in period t,
Kt+1=It.
3 Financial Contract
An entrepreneur j whose net worth is lower than its desired amount of in-
vestment has to borrow from the capital market. At the end of period t
entrepreneur j’s net worth is equal to N
j
t+1. Then, the amount of resources
that he has to obtain from external funds to …nance his expenditures in the














t+1 is the entrepreneur j’s foreign debt denominated in terms of the
foreign good, qtIt is the expenditure required to produce It units of capital,
and N
j
t+1 is the net worth of entrepreneur j in terms of home good.
Note that entrepreneurs borrow from an intermediary abroad and house-
holds save abroad, so we rule out the existence of local intermediaries. Do-
ing this we eliminate the possibility that households lend to entrepreneurs
through a local intermediary. All contracts are denominated in foreign cur-
rency. Again, this eliminates the possibility of intra-country contract de-
nominated in local currency.6 At period t foreign intermediaries face an
alternative cost equal to the risk-free world interest rate R¤
t+1.
The …nancial structure plays a role given the costly state of veri…cation
problem. In this scenario, only the borrower (entrepreneur) can observe the
outcome of any speci…c capital investment at no cost. This …nancial contract
involves auditing strategies by lenders, which introduce agency costs into the
6Again, I do this for expository reasons.
8process. The auditing cost is assumed to be a proportion ¹ of the capital
good produced. Following Gale and Hellwit (1986) it is possible to show
that the incentive compatible loan contract will specify a set Aj=[0;!j) of
realizations of the shock in which veri…cation of the return will occur. In the
rest of the events, F j=[!j;1], no veri…cation occurs. The payment to the
lender if ! 2 Aj equal to the project return. If ! 2 F j the repayment is not
contingent on the return but a …xed repayment X
j
t+1. The threshold value,
!j, such that the entrepreneur will be able to repay the loan for !j > !j at
contractual rate X
j










t+1 is the expected price of capital in terms of home good, and pt+1 is
the expected relative price of the foreign good in terms of the home good. For
!j · !j, the entrepreneur cannot repay the loan to the rate X
j
t+1 and must
declare default. At this moment the lender pays the auditing cost and keeps
what is found. Thus, the intermediary gets (1 ¡ ¹)
!jRK
t+1qtIt
pt+1 units of foreign
good and the entrepreneur gets nothing. When !j ¸ !j, the entrepreneur
can repay the loan at rate X
j












t+1. No agency costs
are incurred in this case.
A loan contract speci…es the cuto¤ value !j and a contractual rate X
j
t+1.
The intermediary accepts these terms if the expected return of this operation


















This equation states that expected repayments net of expected monitoring
costs must at least be equal to the intermediary’s opportunity cost.















where expectations re‡ect the fact that RK
t+1 is a random variable that the





t+1 into equations (11) and (12) to express the contract
problem just in terms of !j and It. The incentive-compatible loan contract









































where the return to capital in period t+1, the relative price of home goods
in period t and t+1, and the net worth of entrepreneur j are taken as given
in the maximization problem.
Following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) it is possible to show

























represents the expected discounted return on cap-
ital. So in equilibrium this term has to be greater or equal to 1. This equation
is the key relationship in the …nancial-accelerator literature. It shows that
capital expenditure of entrepreneur j is proportional to his net worth, with
a proportionality factor increasing in the external fund premium that entre-
preneurs have to pay above the risk-free rate. Inverting this equation we can
















g with @Á(¢)=@It > 0: (16)
This relation shows that the external …nance premium depends inversely
on the contribution of entrepreneur j0s own funds (net worth) as a proportion
of the total investment cost.
104 The General Equilibrium Model
4.1 The Financial Contract
The previous section presented the solution to the partial equilibrium con-
tracting problem between the lender and the entrepreneur. The relations
obtained are now introduced in a dynamic general equilibrium model which
allows us to endogenize the return to capital, and the relative price of cap-
ital. In order to obtain the aggregate supply curve for investment we must
aggregate equation (15) over all entrepreneurs. The aggregate supply curve

























If entrepreneurs’ net worth is lower than investment expenditures, entre-
preneurs must pay a positive risk premium over the risk-free interest rate.
Moreover, entrepreneurs face an external …nance premium decreasing on their
own net worth. At this point it is appropriate to emphasize a characteristic
of this model. The risk premium that entrepreneurs must pay is a function
(among other things) of the real exchange rate.7 Thus, changes in the real
exchange rate will a¤ect the cost of new investment and, through this chan-
nel, will a¤ect the cost of external capital that entrepreneurs face. As it will
become clear later, this is not the only channel through which changes in the
real exchange rate a¤ects the external cost of capital. Speci…cally, changes
in the real exchange rate also will a¤ect net worth.









As it was mentioned before, I assume that in each period a constant frac-
tion (1-±) of entrepreneurs die. This assumption implies that entrepreneurs
have …nite horizons precluding entrepreneurs of accumulating enough funds
7Remember that the price of capital (q) is a function the real exchange rate (p).
11to become self-…nanced. New generations of entrepreneurs replace the ones
who die. Entrepreneurs inelastically supply labor receiving a wage W e for
their services.8 Entrepreneurs who die at period t are not allowed to work or
to invest just to consume home goods.9





















Aggregate net worth is equal to the gross earnings on capital holdings
less the repayment of borrowing and the monitoring costs plus the real wage
earnings. Note that if the debt is denominated in terms of the foreign good,
debt repayments are conditional on the actual real exchange rate, pt. If debt
were denominated in terms of the home good, the repayment would be …xed
in terms of the home good. In this case the term
pt
pt¡1R¤







. Therefore, unanticipated real exchange rate depreciations
(rises in p) increase debt repayments, lowering net worth, which will in turn
decrease investment.10
4.2 Equilibrium Relations
Equilibrium in the capital market is given by the demand and supply for
capital. Supply of capital is given by equation (18) while the demand for
















The evolution of the entrepreneurs’ budget constraint is given by
qtKt+1 = ptDt+1 + Nt+1; (22)
8This assumption is introduced in order to assure that new entrepreneurs born at period
t to have some positive net worth at the moment they try to obtain external funds.
9The total labor input Lt is a composite of household labor, Ht, and entrepreneur
labor He
t . In particular, Lt = H-
t H
e(1¡-)
t . Both components are assumed to be supplied
inelastically in an amount equals to 1.
10The role of unanticipated changes in p will be discussed in details later on.
12where Dt+1 corresponds to the total amount of loans that entrepreneurs ob-
tain from lenders. Combining this last equation with equation (20), we obtain






















t = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ -)Yt:
Entrepreneurs who die at period t are assumed to consume all their in-



















t is the entrepreneur consumption of the home good. Now, aggre-
gating the resources constraints of households, and entrepreneurs (equations
















I assume that the rest of the world is much larger than the domestic
economy and that its spending in the home good is a negligible fraction of
its income. Also, the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 1. In this case
the value of domestic exports in terms of the foreign good is …xed. Therefore,
the foreign demand for the home good is given by
C
H¤
t = ptX: (26)
where X is the …xed value of domestic exports in terms of the foreign good.








13the current account equation rewrites
pt(Bt+1 ¡ Dt+1) ¡ ptR
¤
























t is the household consumption of the home good, and IH
t is the
entrepreneurs’ demand of the home good for investment purposes. These
elements are equal to the total output of the home good net of monitoring
costs.
Finally, the solution to the maximization problem of the representative
household yields standard …rst-order conditions for consumption of home and























The complete set of equations that de…nes the model has been presented.
In the next section I will describe the non-stochastic steady state of the
model.
5 Steady-State and Dynamics
5.1 The steady-state
The steady state is characterized by constant levels of consumption, stocks
of capital and debt, and by constant value of the real exchange rate.11 From
equation (20) and using the steady-state relation for RK (equation (19)), we
can obtain the steady-state relation for the net-worth
11The complete set of equationts is presented in the appendix A where I assume that
the idiosyncratic shock to the production of the capital good, !, is distributed uniformly



















Note that the real exchange rate depreciation term is not present in the
steady-state. Thus, one key channel in order to generate multiplicity of
equilibria has disappeared. Only unanticipated changes in the real exchange
rate makes the debt denomination issue become relevant in this model.
The second relation is given by the supply of capital and the demand for








By combining this last equation together with the net worth relation
for the steady state, we obtain the equilibrium in the capital market as a
relation between q, the cost of one unit of capital in terms of the home
good, and K, the equilibrium level of capital. One feature of this relation is
that the level of capital and the real exchange rate are negatively correlated
across steady states. The intuition is simple, a lower q reduces the cost of
investment expenditures as a proportion of the net-worth. This increases
the supply of funds for any given level of external …nance premium. On the
other hand, a reduction of q increases the marginal productivity of capital
production increasing its demand. These two e¤ects combined increase the
level of capital in equilibrium.
Finally, the third relation necessary to determine the steady-state is the
equilibrium in the home good market. Using equations (22) to (30) we can
obtain the next equilibrium relation12
AK
® = º(1 ¡ ®)-AK
® +
(1 ¡ ±)






















where µ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign inputs in
the production of capital. Combining equation (32), (33) and (34) we obtain
a unique steady state equilibrium for the system.
12I assume that the steady state holdings of bonds by households are zero.
155.2 The log-linearized system
In this section I present the log-linearized version of the model. Lower case
represents deviation of the variable with respect to its steady state value.
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t+1 ¡ ¼t+1 = ¡Â(nt+1 ¡ qt ¡ kt+1) (38)
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qt = 'pt (40)
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Equations (35) and (36) represent the familiar log-linearized versions of
the resource constraint of the economy and the Euler equation. The term
Á
y
t re‡ects the deviation of the aggregate monitory cost with respect to its
steady state level.
Equation (37) represents the log-linearized version of the net worth evo-
lution. An unanticipated depreciation of the real exchange rate reduces net
worth by a term that is proportional to the steady state level of leverage.
A higher level of debt with respect to the total investment expenditure, in-
creases the e¤ect of unanticipated devaluations in the evolution of the net
worth.13
Equation (38) represents the log-linearized version of the supply of capi-
tal (18). This equation re‡ects the importance of the net worth relative to
the investment purchases. A negative deviation of this ratio from its steady
state value, temporarily increases the risk premium that …rms have to pay
in order to obtain loans from intermediaries. Without capital market fric-
tions the term Â(nt+1 ¡qt ¡kt+1) becomes zero. Note also that in this open
economy version, the real exchange rate in‡uences the behavior of the risk
premium through two di¤erent channels. First, a real exchange rate higher
than its steady state level (depreciated) increases the cost of producing cap-
ital inducing to a high external …nance premium for given values of n and k.
Second, a depreciation of the real exchange rate with respect to its steady
state value, reduces net worth due to debt denomination.
The equation (39) represents the linearized version of the demand for cap-
ital or the marginal productivity of capital. Note that given the assumption
of complete depreciation, this term is completely predetermined in absence
of productivity shocks.
Equation (40) relates the evolution of the price of capital and the price
of the real exchange rate. The term ' represents the elasticity of the capital
price tochanges in the real exchange rate. For the Leontie¤ case this elasticity
is equal to
(1¡°)p
°+(1¡°)p. It can be shown that this value is decreasing in ° for
given values of p. This can be considered a potential source of instability for
economies with more dependence on the foreign good. For the same level of
volatility of the real exchange rate, the volatility of the capital price is higher
when ° is higher, inducing to larger changes in investment response.
Equation (41) is the linearized version of the home good production tech-
13See appendix B for a formal derivation of this e¤ect.
17nology. In my model only changes in productivity, represented by at, a¤ect
present output given that capital is predetermined from the previous period
and labor supply is …xed.
Equation (42) is the de…nition of the change in the real exchange rate.
The evolution of home good requirements in the production of capital is rep-
resented by equation (43). A depreciation of the real exchange rate increases
q, which induces entrepreneurs to substitute foreign for home goods. The
reaction of the demand for the home good by entrepreneurs is weighted by
the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs. Also, the demand for
the home good reacts to changes in the aggregate level of investment of the
…rm, kt+1. Equation (44) represents the external demand for the home good.
Finally, equations (45) and (46) describe international real interest rate
and productivity process. Process "i
t (i=r, a) is assumed to be serially un-
correlated.
6 Calibration
The discount rate ¯ is assumed to be equal to 1
R¤. This condition ensures that
we have a well de…ned steady state. The quarterly international real interest
rate is set to 1%. For the production of capital technology I set the elasticity
of substitution, µ, to be either 0 or 1. The former implies the Leontie¤
technology and the second one, the Cobb-Douglas technology. The home
good share in the production of capital, °, is set to either 0.5 or 0.8. These
numbers are consistent with the evidence of the importance of the imported
capital goods in trade volumes. The consumption production technology is
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with a capital share of 0.35, a household labor
share of 0.6435, and an entrepreneurial labor share of 0.0065. This last value
is su¢ciently small to assure that the model collapses to a standard RBC
model in absence of capital market frictions.
The remaining parameters in the model are chosen to imply a steady
state risk premium of four hundred basis point and a ratio of net worth
to investment expenditures in steady state equal to 0.7. This last value is
fairly high, in special for the values observed in small open economies. One
additional step must be done in order to close this value to the one observed
in the data. However, any success in this direction will tend to ratify the
results obtained because it will stress the role of the debt in the ampli…cation
of the shocks. The monitoring costs are assumed to be 25% of the total assets
18of the …rm in case of bankruptcy. Then, ¹ is set to be 0.25. The survival
probability ± is set to 0.92 while the idiosyncratic productivity variable ! is
assumed to be distributed uniformly in the support [0,2].
The persistence of the world interest rate and productivity shocks are
assumed to be 0.8 and 0.5 respectively.
7 Simulation
I consider two types of shocks hitting the economy, a world interest rate
shock, and a productivity shock. The economy response under imperfect
capital markets is contrasted with the reaction of an economy with perfect
capital market, i.e. an economy where ¹ is equal to zero. In the case of
perfect capital market the model collapses to an standard RBC model where
the ownership of capital is irrelevant. I also study impulse responses of the
variables in the model for di¤erent requirements of the foreign good in the
production of capital. In this case, °, represents how important the home
good is relative to the foreign good in the production of the capital good.
Finally, I present results that account for the importance of the degree of
substitution between inputs in the production of capital. In this case, I
report the economy reaction for elasticities of substitution for the Leontie¤
case (µ=0) and Cobb-Douglas (µ=1).
7.1 World Interest Rate Shock
Figure 1 shows the response of the economy to a temporary 2% increase
in the world interest rate, r¤, for both the perfect and imperfect capital
market cases. Given that labor supply is …xed and capital is predetermined
in the previous period, the initial output response is the same for both cases.
However, after the initial period the response of output in the imperfect
capital market case is more than twice the response of output for the perfect
capital markets case. The answer to this amplifying e¤ect can be found in
the behavior of the investment. On impact, investment in the capital market
friction case decreases almost 75% more than under perfect capital markets.
The unanticipated increase in the world interest rate decreases the demand
for capital. The decrease in the demand for capital reduces both the demand
for home and foreign goods. The decrease in the demand for the home good
by investors generates a decrease in the relative price of the home good or a
19depreciation of the real exchange rate. But now, the depreciation of the real
exchange rate increases debt repayments that entrepreneurs face due to the
debt denomination. In this scenario, net worth is decreased exacerbating the
credit constraint faced by entrepreneurs, therefore, deepening the decrease
in the demand for capital and amplifying the reaction of the economy.
Another dimension that can be analyzed is the role played by the foreign
good in the production of capital. Figure 2 shows the reaction of the econ-
omy to the same 2% increase in the world interest rate for di¤erent values
of °, the requirement of the foreign good in the production of capital. A
higher value of ° implies a lower use of the foreign good in the production
of capital. As can be seen, a higher requirement of the foreign good tends to
amplify recessionary e¤ects of the increase in r¤. In fact, the reaction of the
output and investment more than double the case with lower foreign good
requirements. It is worth noting that the reaction of the real exchange rate is
similar in both cases. Which implies that the e¤ect of the debt denomination
should not be very di¤erent in both cases. However, the e¤ect on the price
of capital is signi…cantly di¤erent. A higher ° implies a higher elasticity of
the capital price q to changes in p, reducing the demand for capital in a
more strongly manner. It is important to stress this last result. Small open
economies are likely to be dependent to imports of capital good in order to
produce goods. This dependence in the foreign good is clearly a source of
instability and ampli…cation of the shock.
Finally, …gure 3 shows the economy reaction to the interest rate shock for
di¤erent elasticities of substitution between home and foreign goods in the
production of capital. As can be seen both patterns seem to be similar for
output and investment. However, the reduction in demand for home goods
by entrepreneurs is less strong in the case where entrepreneurs can substitute
the foreign good for the home good. This is what is happening in this case.
The depreciation of the exchange rate or the increase in the price of the
foreign good in terms of the home good stimulates the substitution e¤ect
between home and foreign goods. Entrepreneurs that can substitute factors
would like to do it in a more aggressive way. However, output of the home
good is …xed in the initial period which limits their ability to obtain more
of that factor. This element determines the hump-shaped pattern of the
demand for the home good for investment purposes. Output loses tend to be
higher for the case of more substitution because of the price of capital e¤ect.
The increase in the price of capital is higher when µ is higher, generating a
higher fall in investment and by this mean on output.
207.2 Productivity Shock
The second experiment I address is a shock to productivity in the production
of the home good. In particular, I consider the reaction of the economy to a
1% fall in the productivity level with respect to its steady state level. Figure
4 shows the reaction of two economies, one with capital market frictions
and the other one without imperfections in the capital market. The fall in
output for both economies is almost the same. The question that arises is
that capital market frictions do not seem to amplify the productivity shock
in this case. In this model that is the case because of the debt denomination.
Unexpected changes in the relative prices have redistributive e¤ects from
lenders to borrowers or vice versa. In this case, the fact that production is
a¤ected negatively by the productivity shock generates an increase in the
prices of the home good in terms of the foreign good. This unanticipated
appreciation of the real exchange rate redistribute wealth from lenders to
borrowers which obligations are denominated in terms of the foreign good.
This last e¤ect tends to compensate the fall in net worth due to the lower
rent of capital.
Figure 5 presents impulse responses of the variable in the model for two
di¤erent level of home good requirement, °, in the production of capital. As
it is was stressed for the case of the interest rate shock, what it makes the
di¤erence here is the lower elasticity of the price of capital to changes in the
real exchange rate. The fall in production and the consequent fall in the
price of the home good, has a lower impact in the cost of investment when °
is higher or the home good is more important in the production of capital.
This last e¤ect tends to generate a more pronounced pattern for the fall in
investment and a slightly more contractionary e¤ect on output.
Finally, …gure 6 presents the economy reaction when we introduce the
“elasticity of substitution dimension”. The dynamics di¤er basically in those
related to the consumption of the home and foreign good by the entrepreneurs
(for investment purposes). In this case, the higher price of the home good
leads entrepreneurs to substitute this factor for the cheaper one, the foreign
good. To the extent that the elasticity of substitution is positive they can
do it. The patterns for the home and foreign goods used in investment
activities con…rm this last e¤ect. When µ is equal to 1, the fall in the home
good investment is more pronounced while for the foreign good is almost
unchanged with respect to its initial level. This substitution e¤ect mitigates
the e¤ects of the negative shock in productivity over investment and to some
21extent over the output evolution.
8 Conclusions
This paper presents a dynamic model for a small open economy with imper-
fect …nancial market that provides a framework to analyze the role of credit
constraints in the generation and ampli…cation of economic instability. As
in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the imperfection in the …nancial market
results from the existence of a costly state of veri…cation (CSV) problem.
Entrepreneurs whose net worth is not enough to …nance their desired phys-
ical investment have to pay a premium above the risk-free interest rate to
obtain external funds. The e¤ects of negative external shocks are ampli…ed
by credit constraints. Another key ingredient of the model is that a foreign
good is used in domestic investment. In this context, a real depreciation
generates an increase in the cost of producing capital inducing to a reduc-
tion in investment and output. Moreover, the increase in the price of capital
reduces entrepreneurs’ net worth/investment expenditures ratio, increasing
the risk premium that entrepreneurs have to pay for every level of capital.
Thus, investment and subsequent output are a¤ected negatively even more.
I also assume that the debt is denominated in terms of the foreign good. In
this context, negative shocks that generate depreciation of the real exchange
rate reduce the net worth of the economy due to debt denomination.
The model was calibrated and simulated in order to analyze the quantita-
tive reaction of the economy to world interest rate and productivity shocks.
The main conclusions obtained are that credit constraints play a role in the
ampli…cation and transmission of external shocks. Second, to the extend that
debt is denominated in terms of the foreign good, the e¤ects of increases in
the world interest rate or loss of con…dence by foreign investors are magni-
…ed. Output and investment present more recessionary patterns in this case.
Finally, the fact that a foreign good is used as an input in the production
of the capital good is also an important source of dynamic in the model.
Indeed, shocks that tend to depreciate the real exchange rate are deepened
when the foreign good component is more important. More severe losses in
output and investment are predicted by the model. This pattern resembles,
to some extent, the one observed in …nancial crisis episodes such as Chile
(1982), Mexico (1994), and East Asia (1994).
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F + qK + C
e = Y + p(R




















In this appendix I show the asymmetric e¤ects of unanticipated changes
in relatives prices on net worth depending on the degree of leverage that
the …rm exhibits. Given that capital is …xed in period t, net worth, Nt+1,
is determined by the relative price of foreign goods in terms of home good
(equation (20)). This dependence stems from the debt denomination in terms
of the foreign good. An increase in pt (a devaluation of the real exchange
rate) raises debt payments in terms of the home good, lowering the net worth.
If the debt were denominated in terms of the domestic good, the expression
pt
pt¡1R¤






. In this case, the payment in period t
would be …xed in terms of the home good. In such a case, unexpected changes
in the real exchange rate will not a¤ect the net worth but will redistribute
wealth from lenders to borrowers.
At this point it is important to mention that the e¤ect of unexpected
changes in pt will depend on the degree of leverage of …rms. To illustrate this




























t is the unexpected shift in
pt
pt¡1. We can express Vt as




t(qt¡1Kt ¡ Nt) (65)
Now, di¤erentiatingequation (36) withrespectto the unanticipated move-
ment in the rate of depreciation, U
¢p


















This lastexpression represents the elasticity ofentrepreneurial equity with
respect to an unanticipated movement in the rate of real depreciation. This
elasticity lies in the range (¡1;0], depending on the entrepreneur’s degree
of leverage. The higher the ratio of net worth to investment expenditure,
the lower this elasticity. In particular, if this ratio is lower than 0.5 then this
elasticity is higher than 1 in absolute value. Now, we can see why sudden
depreciations when the debt is denominated in terms of the foreign good
have an asymmetric e¤ect depending on the degree of leverage. As we saw,
countries with higher …nancial development exhibit higher ratios of debt to
net worth, which increases their exposure to external shocks when debt is
denominated in terms of the foreign good.
Depreciations of the real exchange rate, pt, also a¤ect the entrepreneurs’
demand for home good. The e¤ect of pt on IH
t operates through two channels
working in opposite directions. Let us consider an increase in pt, the relative
price of the foreign good in terms of the home good. Increases in pt in turn
increase qt, the capital price index, which generates a rise in the demand
for home goods for investment purposes. Entrepreneurs using both goods
(foreign and home goods) in the production of capital will substitute for
the relatively more expensive foreign good, a less expensive home good. We
call this the substitution e¤ect. On the other hand, increases in pt raise
the external …nance premium that entrepreneurs face reducing investment in
equilibrium. An increase in pt raises investment expenditure (qtIt) reducing
the contribution of entrepreneur j0s own funds (net worth) as a proportion
of total investment cost. We called these the income e¤ect. The income and
substitution e¤ects have opposite in‡uences. If the income e¤ect dominates
the substitution e¤ect, an increase in pt decreases entrepreneurs’ demand for
home good.
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